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The Right to a Fair Trial and the
Confrontation Clause: Overruling




The right to a fair trial is the linchpin of the criminal justice
system. The right protects individuals from arbitrary and unlawful
deprivation of basic rights and freedoms - most importantly, life and
liberty. The United Nations describes the right as an "inalienable
right of all members of the human family," a "foundation of freedom,
justice and peace in the world," and a "fundamental" guarantee of
human rights and preservation of the rule of law.1
The right to a fair trial transcends differences in legal systems.
As evidenced by the United Nations decree, the right to a fair trial is
a widely shared fundamental right. Countries with diverse legal
traditions, including both common law and civil law jurisdictions,
adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. The
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1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (II1) preamble,
U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948), available at http:/www.un.org/Overview/
rights.html [hereinafter Universal Declaration]. For the purposes of this article, the
term criminal justice system refers to the system of local and national government
organizations directed at maintaining social control, deterring and controlling crime,
and sanctioning those who violate criminal laws.
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procedural rubric through which to protect the right to a fair trial
manifests in most, if not all, legal systems. The right to a fair trial
bridges the gap between otherwise divergent legal systems, and
becomes an appropriate platform through which to compare
procedural and substantive derivatives of this shared set of values.
In the United States, the right to a fair trial has become
inextricably linked to a defendant's right to confront and cross
examine witnesses in criminal matters, enshrined in the Sixth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. As such, the right to
confrontation now constitutes the hallmark protection in adversarial
legal systems. The right to confrontation, however, goes well beyond
adversarial systems. The International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, the 1949 Geneva Conventions ("GC") and the 1977 Protocols
all contain Sixth Amendment analogues. Although rooted in English
Common Law, the modern concept of the right to a fair trial,
common throughout much of the international community, was
adopted and modeled after the U.S. Constitution's Sixth
Amendment.2
Similarly, the right to confrontation is universal: diverse legal
systems maintain the right to confrontation as an integral component
of fair trial protections. Unlike other legal systems, however, the
United States has gone too far to protect the right to confrontation.
The Supreme Court recently created an unnecessarily inflexible right
to confrontation in Crawford v. Washington and Giles v. California.3
In so doing, the modern U.S. right to confrontation gives a defendant
2. See, e.g., Susanne C. Walther, Pipe Dreams of Truth and Fairness., Is
Crawford v. Washington a Breakthrough for Sixth Amendment Confrontation
Rights?, 9 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 453, 455-56, 469 (2006). As the Crawford Court
notes, the right to confrontation dates back to Roman times, but "the founding
generations immediate source of the concept ... was the common law." Crawford,
541 U.S. at 43. For an even earlier view of the Confrontation clause, or information
about its ancient and medieval relatives, see generally Frank R. Hermann &
Brownlow M. Speer, Facing the Accuser. Ancient and Medieval Precursors of the
Confrontation Clause, 34 VA. J. INT'L. L. 481 (1994). This statement, regarding
"modeling" after the United States concept of the right to confrontation does not
mean that the rights do not serve different functions across different legal systems.
However, what is unique about many of the ad-hoc tribunals (the "ICTY" and
"ICTR"), the ICC, and recent national tribunals established to deal specifically with
war crimes (e.g., the Iraqi High Tribunal) is that the United States has contributed
significantly to the development of the codes of evidence and procedure used by
these tribunals that mirror the Confrontation Clause.
3. Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 (2003); Giles, 128 S.Ct. 2678 (2008).
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an advantage to the detriment of other competing rights in the
criminal justice calculus. The genesis was unnecessary to ensure the
right to a fair trial, not to mention unprecedented and inconsistent
with Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.
Unlike the United States, other countries have struck a more
harmonious balance between the other competing rights in the
criminal justice system, while nonetheless ensuring a defendant's right
to a fair trial. These international and foreign perspectives
demonstrate how other communities, clearly concerned with
providing a right to a fair trial, have balanced the competing tensions
between victim's and defendant's rights, and social needs. These
flexible approaches are in better accordance with the pragmatic
realities of criminal adjudication, and, surprisingly, the U.S.
Constitution. Many international and foreign versions of the right are
more faithful to the original underpinnings of the Sixth Amendment
than the Supreme Court's new interpretation. Ironically, the United
States has moved further away from its own historical scope and
impression of the right than any of the adopting foreign and
international communities.
While many maxims counsel that extra protections are better
than inadequate safeguards, the reality is that this right, as all other
rights, implicates significant countervailing rights. Victims specifically
and society in general have at least an equal interest as that of a
defendant to the fair and just resolution of criminal matters.
Crawfords articulation of the right to confrontation constitutes a
unique departure from the origin and development of the right
throughout U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence, and results in a right
that threatens the equilibrium of rights within the criminal justice
system to the detriment of victims and society as a whole. Society has
a need to deter criminal conduct, remove dangerous actors from
society, and ensure that justice results. Victims have a right to
restitution, to be free from future criminal assaults, and perhaps
retribution. When we can't prosecute these crimes, we experience a
large social cost to the benefit of a defendant who does not
necessarily require this new procedural right to ensure a fair trial.
Part II of this note explores the global definition of a right to a
fair trial and the textual foundations of the U.S. version of the right to
a fair trial, including the right to confrontation. Part III discusses the
competing interests implicated during criminal adjudications. Part IV
maps the purpose and origin of the right to confrontation, and
discusses both the reliability and procedural models of the right. Part
2009]
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V discusses the right to confrontation in foreign and international
jurisdictions, and how these jurisdictions handle the balance between
competing rights within the criminal justice system. Part VI defends
the propriety of international comparisons of the right to
confrontation to the U.S. interpretation of the right. Part VII
discusses the evolution of the right to confrontation throughout U.S.
Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, and how the right to confrontation
evolved in Crawfordis at odds with the Court's original interpretation
of the right. Part VIII discusses why it is important to overrule
Crawford by exploring a case study of particularly affected criminal
prosecutions within the U.S. criminal justice system involving sexual
violence. This uniquely affected area serves as an exemplar for how
the new Crawford rule has undermined effective and just
prosecutions for victims and society alike within the United States.
Finally, Part IX argues that the right to confrontation as recently
developed in the United States is not consistent with the history or
purpose of the right, and should be rearticulated to preserve a more
equal balance between the competing rights implicated throughout
the criminal justice system. This reevaluation returns the right to
confrontation to its historical function as the guardian of reliable
evidence, while giving victims and society their deserved equality in
the criminal justice system. As international and foreign communities
demonstrate, the right to a fair trial can be maintained despite
protections for victims that form exceptions to a right to
confrontation. Moreover, jurisprudential history in the U.S. supports
compels this very conclusion.
II. Definitions of a Fair Trial: the U.N. and U.S.
Perspectives
The right to confrontation has advanced, in academic circles and
judicial decisions, as the hallmark assurance of a defendant's right to
a fair trial, and is constitutionally protected in the U.S. Constitution
under the Sixth Amendment.' The right to a fair trial is not unique to
the United States. Article 10 of the Universal Declaration, for the
first time on a global scale, generally defined the right to a fair trial as
an entitlement to a "fair and public hearing by an independent and
impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations
4. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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and of any criminal charge against him."'  The International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"), created by the
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
and adopted into force on, March 23, 1976, further evolved the scope
and content of the right.6 Generally, the right to a fair trial
incorporates both procedural and substantive safeguards, with the
ultimate aim of ensuring that "justice"7 results.' Articles 14 and 15 of
the ICCPR outline the "universally articulated" substantive and
procedural minimum requirements. In relevant part, Article 14
subdivision 3(e) highlights the ICCPR corollary right to the right to
confrontation. During the determination of a criminal charge against
an individual, a defendant has the minimum guarantee "[t]o examine,
or have examined, the witnesses against him." 9  This article in
particular is the analogue to the Sixth Amendment right to
confrontation.
In the United States, the right to a fair trial was encapsulated
within the United States Constitution. The Sixth Amendment states:
[T]he accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by
an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
The Sixth Amendment grants a defendant various safeguards
that together embody the procedural and substantive fair trial
5. Universal Declaration, supra note 1, at art. 10.
6. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U,N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, available at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm) [hereinafter ICCPR]. Articles 9 and 10
focus on pre-trial rights that contribute to the overall right to a fair trial. However,
the actual rights guaranteed to the accused during trial are elaborated in articles 14
and 15 of the ICCPR.
7. Black's Law Dictionary defines "Justice" as the "fair and proper
administration of laws." There are many "kinds" of justice, and a philosophical
discussion of each is beyond the scope of this article. However, the term justice used
here most accurately encompasses the terms: "justice" in general, "natural justice,"
defined as "justice defined in a more moral, as opposed to a legal, sense," and "social
justice," defined as "justice that conforms to a moral principle such as that all people
are equal." Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004).
8. See Ana D. Bostan, The Right to a Fair Trial- Balancing Safety and Civil
Liberties, 12 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 1 (Summer, 2004).
9. ICCPR, supra note 6, at art. 14 subd. 3(e).
2009]
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protections. The right to confront witnesses is just one component of
the overarching umbrella right to a fair trial.
The Sixth Amendment and the ICCPR analogue, at first blush,
establish the right to confront witnesses in almost identical terms.
However, as demonstrated in subsequent sections of this note, the
scope of the right to confrontation under both models has not been
interpreted to have breadth and scope. Within the United States, the
boundaries of what, exactly, the right to confrontation guarantees a
defendant are not, and have never been, clear. Moreover, the scope
of the right to confrontation amongst countries ascribing to the
general principles of the Universal Declaration and the ICCPR, is not
consistent.
The primary reason scope differs across various legal systems is
that the scope of the right to confrontation requires balancing various
countervailing rights - and the resulting procedural and substantive
expression of the right is the product of discretionary, or perhaps
societal, value judgments. Very few, if any, rights are absolute. The
right to confrontation is no exception. Provision of a right to
confrontation requires the balancing of three significant rights: 1)
social justice, 2) a defendant's right to a fair trial, and 3) victim's
rights.
III. The Tension Between Victim's Rights, Society's Rights
and a Defendant's Right to a Fair Trial
Society and victims have interests and rights invoked when the
government adjudicates a criminal action. Both have an interest in
the effective prosecution of crimes.' Victims have a right to closure,
vindication for their losses, and freedom from re-victimization from
both the defendant and the trauma of participating in the criminal
justice system. Concurrently, society has a right and desire to punish
offenders - a right irrespective of whether victims are willing to
cooperate in prosecuting their assailants.1" Society has a right because
of intangible notions of social justice and freedom from wrongdoing,
but also for more practical reasons, including the fact that crime
constitutes a significant financial burden, and society needs to remove
10. Walther, supra note 2, at 474.
11. See, e.g., Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L.
REV. 747,771 (2005).
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violent individuals from the community. 2 The cost to victims and
society of victimization in particular is immense."
A. Victim's Rights and Roles
Concern for victims in particular is the "missing link" in criminal
justice worldwide.' Victims suffer loss, injury and trauma at the hands
of the offender. Unfortunately, victims will inevitably suffer
additional hardship, trauma and loss again when they cooperate with
the criminal justice system to effectively prosecute their offenders."5
In most countries, the courts do not sufficiently respect a victim's
right to safety, privacy or reparation.16 In the past, throughout the
international community and foreign criminal justice systems, "little
attention" has been paid to the role and rights of victims.
17
In the United States, beginning in the 1960s, a victims' rights
movement sprung up to advocate for an enhanced role and rights for
victims throughout the criminal justice process. 8 The movement
sought to address three issues: (1) victims often suffer from secondary
victimization when they participate in holding the offender criminally
responsible; (2) it was "fundamentally unjust" that the "person most
affected by the criminal act" had the "least power" in the justice
system; and (3) women and children specifically suffered trauma
during criminal court proceedings.'9 In 1982, United States President
Ronald Reagan created the Task Force on Victims of Crimes to
change a system "appallingly out of balance." 2° The Task Force
12. Cost of Crime and Victimization, U.S. Department of Justice, Office for
Victims of Crime, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/ncvrw/2003/pg56.html
[hereinafter USDOJI.
13. Irvin Waller, CRIME VICTIMS: DOING JUSTICE To THEIR SUPPORT AND
PROTECTION 20, for the European Institute For Crime Prevention and Control (U.N.
Affiliate) (2003), available at http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal-affairs/legal-co-operation/
steeringcommittees/cdcj/cj-s-vict/crime%20victims.pdf [hereinafter U.N. Crime
Victim Report].
14. Sam Garkawe, Victims and The International Criminal Court, 3 INT'L CRIM.
L. REV. 345, 346 (2003).
15. U.N. Crime Victim Report, supra note 13, at 20.
16. Id.
17. Garkawe, supra note 14, at 347.
18. Id
19. Id at 347-348.
20. FINAL REPORT, PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME
STATEMENT OF THE CHAIRMAN, p. vi (Dec., 1982), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ ovc/publications/presdntstskforcrprt/front.pdf; see also
John W. Stickels, The Victim Satisfaction Model of the Criminal Justice System, 2 J.
20091
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resulted in the Federal Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982,"
which enhanced the participation of victims in the criminal justice
system by allowing them to inform juries about their victimization via
victim impact statements. The act also guaranteed restitution for the
first time as a matter of law.23 In 1984, Congress passed the Victims of
Crime Act of 1984.24 This act was the first time Congress enacted
legislation to set up victims' assistance programs and measures to
fund victim compensation.25
Similarly, the United Nations adopted the Declaration of Basic
Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power to
bring victims back into the criminal justice balance.26 The U.N.
Commission on crime prevention and criminal justice actively
endorses government protections, guarantees, and just treatment
within the criminal justice system for both offenders and victims. 2
Despite the victimology movement, criminal justice systems do a
notoriously poor job of providing for victims and meeting their
needs.28
When the criminal justice system fails to embrace victims' rights,
the state cannot prosecute for two reasons: victims either personally
opt not to participate in the criminal justice system or are prevented
from doing so in light of threats or reprisals. Although the state can
theoretically prosecute in some instances without victim participation,
the practical reality is that prosecution is rarely successful without
victim participation.
Victims, in particular victims of sexual assaults, opt not to
participate in the criminal justice system because they see "judges as
too indifferent to their concerns, defendants as too powerful in the
balance of power in the courts, and prosecutors as too insensitive to
Crim. & Crim. Just. Research & Educ. 1 (2008), available at http://www.scientific
journals.org/journals2008/j-of-Criminologyl_2008.htm [hereinafter Stickels, Victim
Satisfaction].
21. Stickels, Victim Satisfaction, supra note 20, at 3.
22. Stickels, Victim Satisfaction, supra note 20, at 3.
23. Id.
24. 42 U.S.C. § 10601.
25. Stickels, Victim Satisfaction, supra note 20, at 3.
26. Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of
Power, G.A. Res. 40/34, U.N. Doc. A/Res/40/34 (November 29, 1985), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/h-comp49.htm.
27. U.N. Crime Victim Report, supra note 13, at 30.
28. Id; see also, e.g., G.A. Res. 46/52, U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/152 (December 18,
1991), available athttp://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/46/a46r152.htm.
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their needs."' 9 Witnesses know that that participation in the criminal
justice system is frequently traumatic, and many conclude it is not
worth reliving the experience, exposing personal details, or having
their credibility put on trial. In court, the victim necessarily relives a
painful experience in less than optimal circumstances: The victim
must testify in front of an "indifferent bureaucracy, an assaultive
defense team" and "an unsympathetic media," notably without legal
representation of their own.30 In some instances, victims do not
report crime in the first place. On average, in North America and
Western Europe, only half of victims of common crime call the
police.3' Some types of crime have significantly lower reporting
numbers. In England, sexual assault is only reported 14 percent of
the time. 2 On a global level, the International Crime Victim Survey
reports that only one in three women contact the police after a sexual
assault.33 Victims do not call because victims do not see the criminal
justice system as a "useful agency" after they have been victimized.'
Sometimes, victims report crime but later decide not to testify or
cooperate with the police. This happens for a variety of reasons, and
is not just limited to reluctance to participate in the criminal justice
system. Therefore, even when these crimes are reported, prosecution
might not occur when victims are uncooperative or recant, a common
problem.35
The criminal justice system has an obligation to protect victims
from re-victimization at the hands of the criminal justice system.
Protecting witnesses specifically from the trauma of in court
29. Jeffrey J. Polorak, Rape Victims and Prosecutors: The Inevitable Ethical
Conflict of De Facto Client! Attorney Relationships, 48 So. TEx. L. REV. 695, 696
(2007).
30. Alex C. Lakatos, Evaluating the Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the
International Criminal Tribunal in the Former Yugoslavia: Balancing Witnesses'
Needs Against Defendant's Rights, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 909, 911 (1995). Victims are
not parties during criminal trials in the United States, unlike many civil law
jurisdictions, for example, in France, the state, the defendant, and the victim are all
parties to the trial. Although one can imagine pros and cons of both systems, the
non-party status of a victim in the United States is at least indicative of our long-
standing impression of the victim's role, or lack thereof, in the criminal justice system
and our cultural understanding and impression of the role victims should play.




35. Author's personal observations from working with local and federal
prosecutors as a law clerk over the course of three years.
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participation can be pursued "only so far as cross-examination can be
limited."36  Although the right to confrontation must not yield to
"trivial concerns," the right to confrontation has historically been
abrogated in the United States and abroad to protect victims who
participate in the trial process."
Another significant concern is that witnesses and victims often
fall prey to witness intimidation and reprisals, or are unavailable
because of the underlying crime. Because of the nature and scope of
witness intimidation and reprisals, it is nearly impossible to retrieve
empirical data on the subject. It is also very difficult to prove, and
therefore the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to the right to
confrontation does not comprehensively solve the problem.38 It is
widely accepted, however, that "it is a serious problem against which
measures need to be taken."3 9 Witnesses who testify in court may face
serious risks, including direct threats of safety to themselves or their
family, both before and after testifying in court. This is also not
40
uncommon.
A comprehensive program that could effectively facilitate
prosecution by reducing witness intimidation, reprisal, or
unavailability would minimally need to include limitation of the right
36. Lakatos, supra note 30, at 923.
37. See, e.g., Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 847-848 (1990) ("For this reason,
we have never insisted on an actual face-to-face encounter at trial in everyinstance in
which testimony is admitted against a defendant. Instead, we have repeatedly held
that the Clause permits, where necessary, the admission of certain hearsay statements
against a defendant despite the defendant's inability to confront the defendant")
38. As just one example, a defendant who kills a victim as part of his underlying
crime can invoke his right to confront the victim that he killed. Any statement that
the decedent made prior to the death would be inadmissible against the defendant at
trial unless the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the decedent-
declarant or the statement fell into the narrow exception of dying declarations. The
forfeiture by wrongdoing exception requires that a prosecutor prove the victim was
killed specifically to silence the victim at trial. Even if the defendant killed the victim
as part of the underlying crime to silence the victim for a possible future trial, it
would be nearly impossible to prove because a defendant is constitutionally entitled
to remain silent at trial. See Giles, 128 S.Ct. at 2707 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
39. A. Beijer & A.M. van Hoorn, REPORT ON ANONYMOUS WITNESSES IN THE
NETHERLANDS 526 (2007), available at www.library.uu.nl/publarchief/jb/
congres/01809180/15/b25.pdf.
40. For example, Clarence Ray Allen was notoriously convicted of murdering
three people - murders that he arranged while in prison - to prevent them from
testifying at his retrial. Clarence Ray Allen was the most recent capital offender put
to death in California. See Office of the Governor, Press Release: Governor
Schwarzenegger Denies Clemency to Convicted Murderer Clarence Ray Allen,
available at http://gov.ca.gov/press-release/317/.
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to confrontation in some circumstances. Such measures may include
anonymous testimony where a defendant is entitled to pose questions
to the declarant, but a judge carries out the interrogation, and the
defendant is not entitled to know the identity of the victim. Another
measure, foreclosed by the Supreme Court in Giles v. California,
would have allowed prior reports to law enforcement officers of
violence between the defendant and a murder victim to be entered
into evidence. These two suggestions, however, violate the
Confrontation Clause as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Although any such measures will not necessarily reduce the
likelihood of witness intimidation or reprisals, they will increase the
likelihood of successful prosecution where victims are unavailable to
testify at trial. In some cases, however, defendants surely will not be
as likely to intimidate or dispose of victims if they are aware they will
be prosecuted regardless of whether or not the victim is available. If
the prosecutor is entitled to avoid forfeiture of evidence by victim-
friendly abrogation of the right to confrontation, the "prosecutor,




Violence is a crime against a state, "not merely an abuse meted
out to another citizen. '' 42 Increased and improved prosecution serves
important social ends, including deterring future crime and removing
offenders from the community.43 Prosecution sends an "unambiguous
signal" that violence "will no longer be tolerated."' Increased
prosecution also enables retributive justice, and other "aspirational
goals of society.,
45
When the face-to-face confrontation requirement impairs
prosecution, a prosecution often loses an otherwise viable and worthy
criminal case. Society loses when we are unable to meet these ends.
In order to balance the right to a fair trial with society's and a
victim's myriad rights implicated by the criminal justice process,
protections for the defendant must yield where they do not threaten
41. See e.g. J. Alex Little, Balancing Accountability and Victim Autonomy at the
International Criminal Court, 38 GEO. J. INT'L L. 363, 383 (Winter, 2007).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 380.
44. Id. at 384.
45. Id. at 385.
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the defendant's right to a fair trial, and ultimately protect and balance
the other competing interests within the criminal justice system.
Parties do not agree on the comprehensive procedural mechanisms to
secure a fair trial, but fairness encompasses a defendant's right of
habeas corpus and also justice for victims and society. What fairness
requires depends upon the procedure at issue.
IV. The Purpose of Confrontation: Reliability or
Procedure?
Is "confrontation" meant (1) to provide a procedural right, or (2)
to secure objective veracity? Phrased in the context of the right to a
fair trial, is the right to confrontation primarily a matter of "fair
procedure" or increasing the likelihood of finding the truth? In
theory, these two objectives often work together, but what happens
when there is a tension between them? In the context of competing
rights within the criminal justice system, the scope of the right to
confrontation is the tiebreaker.
The reliability model of the Confrontation Clause, as promoted
by the famous evidentiary jurist John Henry Wigmore and his
followers, contends that the right to confrontation should ensure that
evidence admitted against a criminal defendant is reliable. Phrased in
the alternative, the underlying right protected by the right to
confrontation is that a defendant has a right not to be falsely accused
and subsequently deprived of fundamental rights. By contrast, the
Crawford Court adopted the procedural model of the Confrontation
Clause including that the right to confrontation actually creates a
procedural right to confront and cross-examine witnesses,
independent of simply providing the ultimate assurance of reliable
evidence. 6
Under the reliability model, the right protected is a right to the
reliability of the evidence against an accused. Thus, any mechanism
to ensure that evidence is reliable cannot, by definition, offend a
defendant's right to a fair trial. Consequently, the right to
confrontation can (and has historically been) subject to exceptions
where testimony is considered reliable. Prior to Crawford, the
46. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43-53. The Court did a particularly thorough job at
evaluating the history of the Confrontation Clause, but the author respectfully
disagrees with the ultimately conclusion of the majority that the Confrontation
Clause was always envisaged as a procedural rule.
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hearsay rules formed the boundaries of the Sixth Amendment - and
were, in literal terms, fair trial safeguards in and of themselves.
Under the procedural model, however, the defendant has a right to
confront and cross-examine witnesses. No matter how objectively
reliable the evidence, it cannot be admitted without confrontation if it
is testimonial." Any evidence admitted that is not properly
"confronted" presumably violates a defendant's right to a fair trial.
The Confrontation Clause's purpose can be viewed from these two
distinct perspectives, but one is more historically accurate than the
other. Crawfordwas a dramatic departure from prior Supreme Court
jurisprudence, which had long been rooted in the reliability model of
the Sixth Amendment.
Nearly every evaluation of the history and purpose of
Confrontation Clause starts with the infamous trial of Sir Walter
Raleigh.49 This famous trial was likely "the most important event in
laying the groundwork" for the right to confrontation and the hearsay
47. Crawford only bars testimonial hearsay statements, but Crawford did not
define what "testimonial" means for the purposes of the Confrontation Clause.
Discussion of "testimonial" versus "non-testimonial" hearsay is beyond the scope of
this article. Any reference to inadmissible hearsay pursuant to the Confrontation
Clause assumes the hearsay is testimonial and of the nature barred by Crawford. The
scope of how much evidence is actually testimonial is undoubtedly bound to
constitute much litigation in the years to come. For more information on what
constitutes testimonial hearsay, see Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006), which
is the U.S. Supreme Court's only attempt to date to "comprehensively" define
testimonial. As is clear from Davis, the definition of testimonial hearsay is far from
clear. Although Giles v. California did not discuss the nature of what constitutes
testimonial hearsay, the Court did hint that the testimony at issue in Giles was not
testimonial, but did not give further guidance and limited discussion to the forfeiture
by wrongdoing doctrine. Giles, 128 S.Ct. at 2693 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("I write
separately to note that I adhere to my view that statements like those made by the
victim in this case do not implicate the Confrontation Clause); id, at 2694 (Alito, J.,
concurring) ("[I] write separately to make clear, like Justice THOMAS [sic], I am not
convinced that the out-of-court statement at issue here fell within the Confrontation
Clause in the first place."). Hearsay, for the entire article, is defined according to the
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 801 and 804, which defines hearsay as a statement
made by an out of court declarant not testifying at trial.
48. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
49. See, e.g., Allen D. Boyer, The Trial of Sir Walter Ralegh /sic]: The Law of
Treason, The Trial of Treason and the Origins of the Confrontation Clause, 74 Miss.
L.J. 869, 869 (Winter, 2005) (The trial was "scorn[ed] as a black day in the history of
England and a disgraceful chapter in the history of the common law."). For an
overview of the complete trial, see COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND
PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS FROM
THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE YEAR 1783 16-17 (T.B. Howell & T.C. Hansard eds.,
1816).
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rules, at least in common law jurisdictions 0 For the purposes of this
inquiry, there is little need to go in depth about the history of the case
beyond merely pointing out that no one would suggest the Raleigh
case was fair. The government completely jettisoned commonly held
notions of a fair trial.
There is significant evidence that the totality of the circumstances
and cumulative procedural pitfalls are why Raleigh's trial was
inherently unfair. For example, by "[]framing indictments ... to gain
procedural benefits,"" the English Courts tried Raleigh under the
Treason Statute of 1352, which contained no procedural guarantees
whatsoever. The case was riddled with bribes, and cards were
undeniably stacked in the government's favor. The only evidence
introduced against Raleigh came from one man, Lord Cobham, who
wrote the testimony the day he was arrested in exchange for his
release. Cobham later refused to sign it, and recanted. The
government did not want Cobham to testify in person, so the
government actively kept him from testifying. The prosecutors
introduced the evidence anyway, using an interrogators certificate of
recollection. Furthermore, the judge made "on-the-spot" rulings on
various critical procedural questions, citing no authority, and
adopting doctrines that the majority of English courts rejected. 3
Finally, although Raleigh could respond to the evidence against him,
he could not bring in any evidence on his own behalf.
Raleigh's trial demonstrates a number of low points. The
procedural abuses transcended the right to confront witnesses. As
would logically follow, the right to confrontation, whatever its
purpose, was not the only procedural safeguard that subsequently
evolved to prevent the ills in Raleigh's trial.5 It likely wasn't even the
50. W. Jeremy Counseller & Shannon Rickett, The Confrontation Clause After
Crawford v. Washington: Smaller Mouth, Bigger Teeth, 57 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 8
(Winter, 2005); see also Francis H. Heller, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 104 (1968); compare Margaret A. Berger, The
Deconstitutionalization of the Confrontation Clause: A Proposal for a Prosecutorial
Restraint Model, 76 MINN. L. REV. 557, 578 (1992) (commentators "have expressed
some doubt" that Sir Walter Raleigh's trial influenced the drafting of the
confrontation clause).
51. Boyer, supra note 49, at 883.
52. Id at 889.
53. Id. at 894.
54. Id. at 893.
55. See e.g. Counseller & Rickett, supra note 50, at 4 (short discussion of the
various rights stemming from the confrontation clause); see also generally Carol A.
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most important.5 6
Wigmore laid the groundwork for the right to confrontation as a
means to secure the objective veracity and reliability of evidence
introduced against the accused at trial. The right to confrontation
accomplishes this goal in two primary ways. First, face-to-face
confrontation allows visualization of interpersonal skills and
behavioral conduct that are consistent [or inconsistent] with
trustworthiness. And second, confrontation prevents government
manipulation and/or "sandbagging" of evidence. According to
Wigmore, admissible hearsay evidence itself meets Confrontation
Clause muster: evidence that falls within a hearsay exception
"guarantees that confrontation, and thereby cross-examination, is not
needed."58 Wigmore concluded that the Confrontation Clause was
nothing more than a "truth-seeking mission."5 9  His view of the
relationship between confrontation and hearsay was widely accepted
by the courts, and, according to many legal scholars, clearly formed
the basis for the Supreme Court's view of the confrontation clause
prior to Crawford.60
By contrast, unequivocal proponents claim that face-to-face
confrontation is required to ensure fairness or give a jury the
Chase, The Five Faces of the Confrontation Clause, 40 Hous. L. REV. 1003 (2003)
(in depth discussion of the various procedural protections Courts interpret as
stemming from the Sixth Amendment). Procedural safeguards evolved in England as
well, even before the United States was founded. Chambers that originally relied on
ex parte statements were abolished in 1641, and "the role of the jury" was
strengthened. The "procedural process" that had given the crown "so great an
advantage over the accused," changed. By 1969, defendants could subpoena
witnesses, even in treason, to testify in their defense. The privilege of counsel was
increasingly extended to all defendants to allow for examination and cross-
examination. Confrontation likely formed "part of a pattern of procedural reforms
that gradually curtailed the inquisitorial powers of the crown." The right to
confrontation was viewed "in conjunction with other procedural rights" and as part
of an "arsenal" of procedural protections. See Berger, supra note 50, at 577, 578-579,
586. In sum, it is evident that many of the procedural safeguards available to
defendants today in domestic prosecutions were absent at the time of Sir Walter
Raleigh's trial, not just the right to confront witnesses.
56. See Berger, supra note 50, at 583-84 (Blackstone and the framers of the Bill
of Rights viewed the jury as the principle safeguard of people's liberties, citing
Blackstone's Commentaries).
57. Louise Ellison, THE ADVERSARIAL PROCESS AND THE VULNERABLE WITNESS
72, 76 (2001).
58. Berger, supra note 50, at 592.
59. Id
60. See, e.g., id.
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perception of fairness.6 The "demeanor argument" assumes that
defendants will betray themselves through facial expressions and
other non-verbal behavior.6 2 A defendant thereby compromises his
ability to challenge the case against him if jurors cannot assess the
declarant's non-verbal behavior.63 The "sandbagging argument" goes
as follows: Unless the government is required to produce a declarant,
the government can introduce whatever it wants - including
unreliable evidence - at trial. This is just another example of
common law jurisdictions engendering skepticism of unchecked
governments.
Cross-examination is not the best way of bringing out the truth.
The demeanor argument assumes both that demeanor evidence
supplies valuable clues about a witnesses' reliability, but also that
jurors are capable of identifying and interpreting these cues. 61 Yet,
evidence that these requisite assumptions are true is "thin on the
ground." In fact, extensive studies contradict legal assumptions
regarding the utility of demeanor evidence.65 To name just one
example, speech commonly interpreted as signaling "untruthfulness"
also signifies stress. 66 McCormick, in his authoritative treatise on
Evidence, stated that cross-examination can be "useful" to
determining the truth; however, in many instances a timid but honest
witness is more likely to go "down under the fire of a cross-
examination" than "the rogue." 67 This is particularly true of uniquely
vulnerable victims, like victims of sexual assault, who experience
severe trauma as a result of reuniting with an assailant, and being
subject to a vigorous credibility assault of past sexual experiences. As
such, cross-examination itself can compromise the integrity of
61. Ellison, supra note 57. Empirical research has failed to uncover any "hard
evidence" that laypersons believe non-face-to-face methods of confrontation are
inequitable. According to one study by O'Grady, jurors actually believed that
protective witness measures were used to protect witnesses in part, but also to
facilitate "better, more accurate, more truthful evidence." See Friedman, R.,
Confrontation Rights of Criminal Defendants in Nijober, J. F. and Reijinties, J.M.,
Proceedings of the First World Conference on New Trends in Criminal Investigation
and Evidence, The Hague, The Netherlands, 3-5 (December 1995).
62. Ellison, supra note 57, at 76.
63. Id
64. Id
65. Ekman, P. and Friesen, W.V., Non- Verbal Leakage and Clues to Deception,
32 PSYCHIATRY 88 (1969).
66. Id,
67. McCormick on Evidence, title 10, § 31 (5th ed. 1999)
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testimony and distort the fact-finding process. Studies also show that
jurors are inefficient and inconsistent at spotting these clues.' As
such, primary objections to trial practices that deviate from face-to-
face confrontation are overstated.69
The sandbagging argument is equally unpersuasive. The
practical realities of criminal adjudication demonstrate that witnesses
are oftentimes unavailable for various reasons out of the
government's control - including, at times, due to the nefarious acts
of a defendant. Unless those acts render the witness unavailable with
the specific intent to silence the witness at trial, the witness'
testimonial statements are inadmissible. In general, Crawford critics
do not believe that unreliable, false evidence should be admissible:
simply that reliable evidence should be admissible even absent face-
to-face confrontation. This is particularly true if the witness is
unavailable due to acts committed by the defendant. There are other
procedural mechanisms within the United States, and abroad, that are
used to ensure objective reliability in addition to, and oftentimes in
lieu of, face-to-face confrontation. The Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure and Evidence, as well as thoroughly designed state codes
of evidence and procedure, have established procedural and
evidentiary mechanisms that provide significant protection to the
accused beyond face-to-face confrontation. Some international and
foreign approaches are discussed below.
Crawford largely ignores the fact that for almost a century
scholars have hotly debated the pitfalls and disadvantages of cross-
examination.70 In sum, cross-examination is not the only or even best
way of ensuring the reliability of evidence - and therefore face-to-
face confrontation should not be a per se prerequisite to a fair trial. 1
The importance of direct confrontation is difficult to justify where
evidence is otherwise reliable, and the needs, expectations, and rights
of those other than the defendant require abrogation of the right.72
So, the question remains: is the Sixth Amendment right to
"confrontation" meant to provide a procedural right, or secure
objective veracity? The majority of foreign and international
68. Ellison, supra note 57, at 77.
69. Id
70. Id
71. Andrew W. Choo, Crawford v. Washington: A View from Across the
Atlantic, 2 Int'l Comm. Evid. 4, 5 (2004).
72. Id.
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jurisdictions have evolved or interpreted the analogous right pursuant
to the reliability model.73 Even the U.S. originally embraced the
notion of confrontation as a means of securing reliability, and not a
distinct procedural rule.
V. The Right to confrontation in Foreign and International
Jurisdictions
Many foreign and international courts demonstrate that
confrontation is universally accepted as means to secure reliable
evidence. Foreign jurisdictions similarly maintain that the right to
confrontation is an integral component of fair trial protections.
However, the right to confrontation, at least in the following
jurisdictions, has never been construed as absolute. Foreign courts
worldwide have developed procedural safeguards allowing the right
to confrontation to give way if the right to confrontation threatens the
court's ability to prosecute a crime or protect a witness from
intimidation, reprisal, or re-victimization. Many of these protective
procedural rules would violate the Sixth Amendment under
Crawford, but not the Crawford predecessor, Ohio v. Roberts.'
These procedural mechanisms establish alternate procedures to
ensure the reliability of evidence admitted at trial, but in a more
evenly weighted, nuanced balance of the social right to prosecute
crime, a victim's right to vindicate crime, and a defendant's right to a
fair trial.
A. European Court of Human Rights
The European Convention of Human Rights became effective in
1953, after it was ratified by eight countries.75 Today, only two
73. Not all exclusionary rules of evidence are inspired by reliability. See, e.g.,
U.S. Const. amend. IV (and namely all corresponding jurisprudence). The purpose,
however, behind enforcement of the Fourth Amendment is to deter unconstitutional
police conduct. Without an exclusionary rule, the Constitutional protection would
have an illusory benefit. By contrast, the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause is
only but one of the rights that makes up the fair trial provisions of the Sixth
Amendment. Exclusionary rules under the Sixth Amendment do not deter police
conduct, or serve any analogous purpose: presumably they are only to ensure the
defendant received a fair trial. As such, a comparison to the Fourth, or even Fifth
Amendment, is inappropriate for the purposes of this article.
74. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56.
75. Roger W. Kirst, Hearsay and the Right of Confrontation in the European
Court of Human Rights, 21 QUINNIPIAc L. REV. 777, 779 (2003).
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countries in Europe are not a party to the treaty.76 Each member
country has accepted jurisdiction of the European Court of Human
Rights ("ECHR"), but the court does not possess an "enforcement
mechanism" because the ECHR has no power to reverse a conviction
or effectively order action by a national court.77 ECHR members hail
from both the common law and civil law systems.
The ECHR cases that have interpreted evidentiary issues,
specifically hearsay, broadly: the focus surrounding admissibility is
"whether [or not] there was a fair trial. 78 The ECHR created the
functional equivalent of the right to confrontation in Article 6 of the
Human Rights Convention of 1950.'9 In "many respects," this very
provision "was tailored after the Sixth Amendment."' Article 6(3)(d)
provides that everyone charged with a criminal offense has the
following minimum rights:
to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain
the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under
the same conditions as witnesses against him.
The right to a fair trial provides that confrontation is allowed
through a balancing mechanism, not a categorical rule.81 There is "no
clear distinction" between the nebulous concept of a "fair trial" and
the scope specific provisions that are created by Article 6(3) and 6(1)
concerning the taking and assessment of testimonial evidence.
Therefore, ECHR decisions are not clearly evidentiary based. Again,




79. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/
D5CC24A7-DC13-4318-B457- % C9014916D7A/0/EnglishAnglais.pdf
80. Walther, supra note 2, at 455.
81. See, e.g., Kostovski v. The Netherlands, 166 EUR. CT. H. R. at 20, § 41 (1992)
(hearsay is not a categorical rule: evidence is primarily an issue of national law, and
the tribunal must only consider whether, as a whole, the proceedings were fair.
Statements made pretrial might be used if the rights of the defense have been
"respected"); see also Asch v. Austria, 203 EUR. CT. H. R. (ser. A) at 11, §§ 30-31;
Artner v. Austria, 242 EUR. Cr. H. R. (Ser. A) at 3 (1992) (written statements made
by victims could be introduced even though witness did not testify at trial because the
statements "were not the only evidence" of guilt); Ferrantelli v. Italy, 1996-111, EUR.
CT. H. R. 937 (Demonstrating that whether hearsay use makes a trial unfair depends
upon a combination and consideration of several factors.)
82. Stefano Mattei, THE EUROPEAN RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION IN CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS 68 (2006).
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decisions. 8 To provide just one illustration, some ECHR decisions
have allowed unconfronted testimony if defense counsel did not take
adequate measures to examine the witness."
Furthermore, the Convention obligates member states to
consider witness and victim rights and interests in determining
whether the right to confrontation can be required. In Doorson, the
court held that while Article 6 might not require a court to consider
the rights of witnesses and victims, their "life, liberty or security" do
come under the ambit of Article 8 of the Convention." "Against this
background, principles of a fair trial also require that in appropriate
cases the interests of the defence are balanced against those of
witnesses or victims. '86  Special victim and protective measures,
including anonymity (at issue in the Doorson case) are not simply a
"possibility" but an "obligation" of all ECHR member states under
Article 8.87
In sum, the theme behind many ECHR decisions is that the
government cannot "be held responsible for" the death or
unavailability of witnesses before trial.' As such, anonymous and
unconfronted testimony is admissible in cases of "necessity. '"8 9  A
decedent's prior testimony is per se admissible, regardless of the
method of introduction to the court.' Furthermore, anonymous
testimony is often admissible because it "is not under all
83. Id. at 68.
84. Id. at 81 ("[T]he distance between the seat of the trial and the foreign country
should not become a tool for manipulation. The mere inconvenience of a journey
abroad for a defendant's counsel is not acceptable as a ground for preventing reliance
on this evidence. This is particularly true if, at the relevant time, the applicant had
sufficient financial means to cover the travel expenses or, alternatively, had failed to
appoint counsel in the foreign jurisdiction. Under those circumstances, later
complaints concerning the alleged lack of an 'adequate opportunity' to challenge the
witness' statements have been appropriately dismissed.").
85. Doorson v. Netherlands, 1996- II EUR. CT. H. R. para. 70.
86. Id.
87. Mattei, supra note 82, at 85.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 79.
90. Id This is distinct from dying declarations in the U.S. common law and
Federal Rules of Procedure because statements of the deceased are only admissible if
made in anticipation of imminent death. That means a prosecutor must prove that
the declarant was aware of his or her impending death when the statements were
made, and that death was imminent. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 804 subd. (b)(2). To
describe the difference, the statements ruled inadmissible in Giles would likely have
been admissible in the ECHR simply because the declarant was deceased.
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circumstances incompatible with the Convention."9' As a few
examples of these protective measures, the ECHR has allowed
anonymous witnesses to testify with a finding that a witness fears
violence in reprisal for testifying. 92 This finding can be based on
"generalized fear" even if the witness did not present evidence that
the defendant had threatened him.93 If the appropriate findings are
made, the prosecution can use anonymous witnesses in some
circumstances. 94
In sum, the ECHR does not recognize a right to confrontation,
per se.95 The rules of admissible evidence are adopted as a matter of
the national law of the ECHR's member states.96 However, the
ECHR does not require an opportunity to cross-examine, or confront
the witnesses, as a pre-condition to admissibility.97 The ECHR
instead evaluates the totality of the circumstances in considering
admissibility. In other words, are the proceedings as a whole fair
even if unconfronted testimony is admissible?' To answer, Courts
consider the nature of the offense, threats to the victims and
witnesses, the character of the supposed offender, the declarant, and
other facts related to the specific case.99
B. England and the Criminal Justice Act 2003
England has gone in the opposite direction of the U.S. Supreme
Court. Through the Criminal Justice Act of 2003, English courts are
allowed to admit hearsay into evidence."° Hearsay evidence is
91. Id. at 85.
92. See generally Doorson, 1996- II EUR. CT. H. R.
93. Doorson, 1996- II EUR. CT. H. R. at 470-71.
94. Van Mechelen v. The Netherlands, 1997-II EUR. Cr. H. R. 691, 711, § 52
(some use of anonymous witnesses is permitted under the European Court's
Convention).
95. It is important to note that ECHR decisions are not bound by prior decisions
in the ECHR. Kirst, supra note 75, at 808.
96. Id.
97. See id
98. Id The Court justified use of the anonymous witnesses because (1) counsel
had had a prior opportunity to examine them, (2) the defendant could argue that the
witnesses were not reliable because they were drug addicts, (3) there was additional
evidence supporting the charge, and (4) the courts used the evidence with "the
necessary caution and circumspection." These requirements are not required per se
for admission of anonymous witnesses, but constitute part of the totality of the
circumstances.
99. Id. at 85.
100. Choo, supra note 71, at 4; see also Criminal Justice Act of 2003, ch. XX, §
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admissible under the Act when the "court is satisfied that it is in the
interests of justice for it to be admissible."'' The court engages in an
inquiry that balances the difficulty in challenging a statement with the
probative value, evidentiary importance, and apparent reliability of
the statement.' °2
Under this new "reliability" doctrine, judges have significant
discretion to admit hearsay where reliable. A right to confrontation is
only one factor considered in evaluating the reliability and
admissibility of hearsay, rather than the decisive factor it is in
Crawford.10 3
The Court of Appeals in R v. Sellicl. interpreted the interplay
of the English rules of hearsay with the case law of the ECHR. The
court indicated that article 6(3)(d) does not give a defendant an
absolute right to examine every witness against him. The touchstone
of the right "is whether fairness of the trial requires this." The Court
of Appeals approach is "conducive to justice" because it prevents a
defendant from escaping conviction simply because witnesses and
victims will not testify against him.
C. The Netherlands
Personal confrontation is not an "essential requirement to the
notion of a fair trial" in the Dutch criminal justice system and
typically plays no more than a "secondary role."'05  The Dutch
Supreme Court, the Hoge Raad, has allowed hearsay since 1926.
Out-of-court statements can be used regardless of whether or not the
witness is available to be called.' 6 Direct contact between the court
and the sources of evidence is no longer necessary. Written
statements can be used even if the witness who made the written
statement could have been called as a witness. '°7
Significantly, the judge has discretion regarding whether or not
to allow a defendant to call witnesses to confront him."'"
114(1)(d) (Eng.).
101. Criminal Justice Act of 2003, ch. XX, § 114(1)(d) (Eng).
102. Id. at § 114(2)(h. See generally G. Durston, Hearsay Evidence and the New
Inclusionary Discretion, 168 Justice of the Peace 788 (2004).
103. Choo, supra note 71, at 12.
104. 2006 1 Cr. App. R. 413 at [42].
105. Beijer & van Hoorn, supra note 39, at 524.
106. Id.
107. Id,
108. The defendant has the right to call witnesses and examine them at trial.
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Furthermore, witness statements can be used even if a defendant was
not present when the statements were originally given, or even if the
defendant did not have an opportunity to cross-examine the
witness.1°9 In 1981, the Hoge Raad adopted witness anonymity as a
means of witness protection.11 Also, hearings can be conducted in
private, without the defendant present."' When a witness wishes to
remain anonymous, the judge interviews the witness and assesses the
witness' credibility in addition to substantiating whether or not there
is an appropriate reason to allow the witness to remain anonymous.112
Since the Netherlands is bound by the ECHR, courts must now allow
the defense "some opportunity" to have questions "put" to the
witness."' There are no procedural requirements with respect to
anonymous witnesses, (1) where the defendant does not contest the
reliability of a witness or (2) if there is substantial evidence that
would corroborate or substantiate a conviction in addition to the
anonymous testimony.' 14 In the latter scenario, the court must simply
use the anonymous testimony with "caution and circumspection......
In sum, the defendant does not have a right to confront or have his
counsel confront witnesses against him if the court finds the witness
has reason to remain anonymous. 16  Anonymous witnesses are
allowed to remain completely anonymous if (1) the witness is
threatened, and will not testify unless guaranteed anonymity, (2) the
case involves a "serious crime," and (3) the evidence is not limited to
the anonymous statement."7 A magistrate interviewing the witnesses
makes a determination of the reliability of the statements, which the
judge deciding the case must accept. 118
Wetboek van Strafvordering § 263 [Dutch Code Criminal Procedure § 263].
However, the judge can refuse the right if the non-appearance "cannot reasonably be
considered prejudicial." Biejer & Von Hoorn, supra 39, at 524.
109. Id.
110. Beijer & Van Hoorn, supra note 39, at 526.
111. Dutch Code Criminal Procedure § 292.
112. Beijer & Van Hoorn, supra note 39, at 530.
113. Id
114. Id. at 530.
115. HR 2 July 1990, NJ 1990, 692 and HR 2 October 1991, 130.
116. If the defendant and his counsel are both not present, the prosecutor may
also not be present. See Beijer & Van Hoorn, supra note 39, at 531.
117. Id. at 533. As Beijer & Van Hoorn point out, however, this may not be "strict
enough" in light of some of the ECHR case law. On another note, there are different
types of anonymity in the Netherlands, not discussed here, that are not bound by
these conditions. For more information, see generally id. at 533.
118. Id. at 531.
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The Dutch witness-friendly rules were adopted specifically to
protect witnesses and solve the "serious problem" of witness
intimidation. "9 Interestingly, opponents of anonymous testimony are
mainly "found in academic circles."' 20
D. New Zealand
Under the recently enacted Evidence Act 2006, admissibility of
hearsay evidence in New Zealand hinges on whether or not the
circumstances of the statement provide a reasonable assurance that
the statement is reliable and the witness is unavailable to testify.12 ' In
R v. Bain ("UKPC") 33, p. 115, the court pointed out that the
accused's right to a fair trial requires that the jury hear evidence that
it ought to hear before returning its verdict, not including evidence
that is false.
Although the new Act clarifies and codifies the reliability
approach to hearsay, the New Zealand courts previously utilized the
reliability model as "the approach of admissibility at common law.',
22
In R v. Manase (2001) 2 N. Z. L. R. 197, the court did not admit the
proposed hearsay evidence because the evidence was not reliable, but
concluded that cross-examination would not have made a "relevant"
difference. The witness was available, but the evidence was not
admitted because it was not reliable, even though, presumably, the
defendant retained the right to confrontation.1 23  The approach to
reliability in Manase centers on what the hearsay statement was,
whether it was made by a reliable person, and the risks of
contamination by suggestion.24 In R v. Baker (1989) 1 N. Z. L. R.
738, the prior statements that the deceased was afraid of her husband
were admissible because they were made "the day immediately
preceding her death," and were consistent with remarks over a period
119. Id. at 525.
120. Beijer & Van Hoorn, supra note 39, at 545.
121. The Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong, Hearsay in Criminal
Proceedings Sub-Committee, Consultation Paper, HEARSAY IN CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS 126 (November, 2005), available at http://www.hkreform.gov.hk.
122. Don Mathias, Hearsay Confessions: Probative Value and Prejudicial Effect,
(2007) available at http://www.geocities.com/veneziophile/Hconf.pdf (last visited
February 10, 2008). The New Zealand Courts were previously bound by the rules of
evidence in the Evidence Amendment Act (No. 2) (1980), ch. XX, §§ 8-14, including
the courts of R v. Manase and R. v. Baker, discussed supra note 70-71.
123. R v. Manase, (2001) 2 N.Z.L.R. 197.
124. Id.
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of weeks which itself "has its own weight." In sum, the Baker court
focused on the declarant's reliability, her lack of motive to fabricate,
and her consistency.
12 5
Furthermore, the Evidence Amendment Act 1997 allows judges
to appoint independent council to consider the credibility and
reliability of witnesses, and upon a finding, grant complete anonymity
where necessary.121
E. The Ad Hoc Tribunals of Yugoslavia and Rwanda
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
("ICTY") and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
("ICTR") established their own rules of procedure and evidence, but
there are many common threads that can be discussed together for
the purposes of this note.
The Rules of Procedure of the ICTY and ICTR allow judicial
review of any probative evidence, including hearsay. Before the court
admits the evidence, the Tribunals require that a Trial Chamber
assess its "indicia of reliability." '27  Judges in these tribunals, as
opposed to lay jurors, are revered as capable of assessing the
appropriate weight and credibility of such statements. 28 Judges are
able to substitute testimony with written statements, judicial notice,
or video recording for those who will not or cannot appear live. 9
Many defend these difference because the "common law's approach"
to hearsay and admissible evidence is to ensure that lay jurors are not
unduly influenced by evidence and here there is no risk of
misappropriation in an inquisitorial system.3°
The ICTY and ICTR were given authority to develop special
procedural rules to protect victims and witnesses."' Article 22 of the
ICTY statute states that the "Tribunal shall provide in its rules of
125. R v. Baker (1989) 1 N. Z. L. R. 738.
126. Evidence Amendment Act 1997, ch. XX, § 13(e) (NZ).
127. Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2, Appeals Chamber
Decision on Appeal Regarding Statements of a Deceased Witness, 24, (21 July,
2000).
128. Gregory S. McNeal, Unfortunate Legacies: Hearsay, Ex Parte Affidavits and
Anonymous Witnesses at the IHT 4 INT'L COMM. ON EVIDENCE art. 5, at 3 (2006).
129. Patricia Wald, Fair Trials for War Criminals, 4 INT'L COMM. ON EvID. 6, at 8.
Cannot introduce evidence via these means for all evidence. As a note, Crawford
applies to all evidence, no matter how foundational, cumulative, or otherwise.
130. Id,
131. Garkawe, supra note 14, at 349.
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procedure and evidence for the protection of victims and witnesses."
Such procedures "include, but shall not be limited to, the conduct of
in camera proceedings and the protection of the victim's identity."
The Secretary-General took specific measures to ensure that the
Tribunal incorporated special protections in cases of sexual
violence. 32 Article 21 of the ICTY establishes the scope of the rights
of the accused. The right to confrontation, embodied within the
ICTY codes of procedure, guarantee a right "to examine, or have
examined" the witnesses in front of him. This means specifically that
the defense does not have a per se right to confront witnesses himself
or through his defense counsel.
The rules ultimately adopted constitute a "radical change.'
3
For example, many scholars discuss that the late substantive legal
recognition of sexual offenses in the international criminal arena
"would have achieved little if the procedural mechanisms" had not
been created and implemented.'3  The rules of procedure and
evidence "are exceptional" because they are more "victim friendly
than parallel domestic criminal codes."'35 The codes were created in
large part through consideration of recommendations made by
governmental and non-governmental lobbying, including submissions
from the American Bar Association, the Lawyer's Committee for
Human Rights, and the United States. 6 As an example, the Tadic
case out of the ICTY involved a grant of total anonymity for four
witnesses.' 37 The rulings created a pre-condition that the judge must
be able to observe the demeanor of a witness and assess the
witnesses' reliability, emphasizing that the purpose of confrontation
was the reliability of the evidence.
In the ICTY, Rule 96 is the "centerpiece" of the rules for
prosecution of sexual violations.' 39 As a "significant departure from
132. Lakatos, supra note 30, at 919.
133. Fionnuala Ni Aolain, Radical Rules.: The Effects of Evidential And





137. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-I-T, Decision on the Prosecutors
Requesting Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses, 1$ 53-87 (Aug. 10, 1995).
It is important to note that this grant of total anonymity has been greatly criticized
and has not been granted since. See McNeal, supra note 28, at 3.
138. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-I-T, 1 71.
139. Radical Rules, supra note 133, at 899-900.
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the domestic practice of many States," the Trial Chamber does not
require corroboration of a victim's testimony in the context of a
sexual assault."4 In part, the rule was recognition that prior
corroboration requirements constituted the "legal entrenchment of
distrust that women lie" - a wholly unsubstantiated premise. 4' More
importantly, however, the rule was promulgated because of the
private nature of the crime that, when paired with a corroboration
requirement, made prosecution nearly impossible.
Neither the prosecution nor the defense has "found these rules
impossible to operate under. 1 42 In fact, the number of convictions
and acquittals indicate that the number is analogous to domestic
percentages for acquittals and convictions.4 4 A former judge for the
ICTY concludes that despite the protections for witnesses, the
accused do "get a fair trial at the ICTY." ' 4
F. The Iraqi High Tribunal
The Iraqi High Tribunal ("IHT"), originally the Iraqi Special
Tribunal, is a national tribunal established to address war crimes
committed during a period of defined limited jurisdiction under the
Ba'ath Party. The IHT adopts Iraqi national law, which is civil law,
but created special provisions to adopt procedural and evidentiary
requirements of Article 14 of the ICCPR.145 Article 14 provides, in
part, for the right to confront evidence against the accused.146 The
IHT allows hearsay if the declarant is not available and there are
"other circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.'4 17 At least on
paper, the Iraqi High Tribunal has developed evidentiary rules and
procedures to protect witnesses with the intent to nonetheless ensure
a fair trial by adopting the rules of the ICCPR.
What is unique about the Iraqi High Tribunal is that the United
States played a significant, if not overwhelming role, in developing
the codes of evidence and procedure. Is this an example of the United
140. Id. at 900.
141. Id
142. Patricia Wald, Fair Trials for War Criminals, 4 INT'L COMM. ON EvID. 1, ART.
6, at 8 (2006).
143. Id
144. Id
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States determining that effective prosecutions sometimes require
compromises that we don't allow in our own backyard?
VI. Defending the Propriety of International Comparisons
Critics may question the utility or propriety of comparing the
U.S. Sixth Amendment with foreign or international jurisdictions. As
a threshold matter, reliable evidence is the linchpin of the right to
confrontation in the United States just as it is in the aforementioned
foreign and international courts. Although foreign and international
courts are not bound by the Sixth Amendment, nearly every court has
a rule of evidence and procedure analogous to or modeled after the
U.S. Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. The fact that the Sixth
Amendment does not bind these courts is not dispositive of the
differences between the foreign and international tribunals and the
interpretation of the Sixth Amendment in Crawford. The origin and
purpose behind the right to confrontation, in the United States and
these non-U.S. jurisdictions, is the same. Therefore, examples of how
these jurisdictions balance the very same competing rights in light of
the same objectives - justice through a fair trial and reliable evidence
- are inherently instructive. In other words, a right to confrontation
that overlooks the practical realities and needs of criminal actions,
and the rights of other rights and interests in the criminal justice
system, is not consistent with the purpose and origin of the right to
confrontation within the United States or abroad. This is true not
only because of the purpose of the right to confrontation in all
jurisdictions, as discussed supra, or the history of the right specifically
within the United States, as discussed infra, but also because it better
accords with policy and equality within the criminal justice system.
Others argue that while some jurisdictions may be appropriate
for comparison, jurisdictions discussed throughout the course of this
note are not appropriate subjects for procedural or evidentiary
comparisons because they hail from civil or hybrid legal traditions.
14 8
Civil law systems are described as too distinct: they are not
adversarial and civil law judges, not litigating parties (as in the
common law), "control" fact-finding. In so doing, judges alone
investigate the case, develop evidence at trial, and call and question
148. See, e.g., Mijam Damarska, The Uncertain Fate of Evidentiary Transplants.
Anglo-American and Continental Experiments, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 839, 839-840
(1997).
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witnesses.1 49 Furthermore, judges, and not a jury, stand as the arbiter
of fact.5
With regard to the first difference - the adversarial versus
inquisitorial models of jurisprudence - critics argue that the right to
confrontation should be more mechanical in an adversarial system
because adversarial evidence is more biased. Cross-examination is
necessary for vetting purposes in adversarial systems, whereas the
procedure is not necessary in civil law jurisdictions. In common law
jurisdictions, counsel search and carefully select evidence, prepare
witnesses for courtroom presentation, and interrogate the witness in a
way that best advocates the litigant's interest. 5' This evidence is not
"neutral" because it is introduced and crafted to tell the litigant's
story. To the contrary, litigants in civil law systems do not elicit
evidence through direct or cross-examination.'52 Civil law witnesses do
not testify for a specific litigant - they are "common" once they are
called. Judges ask questions; counsel may only suggest the judge
proceed in a certain way. Presumably, to these proponents, the split
in mechanical protection tracks the lack of necessity for confrontation
in the civil law. As such, the lack of a mechanical procedural rule in
civil law is not illuminating.
The underlying dispute revolves around how to properly "test"
an information source.153
In the context of in-court testimony, that means providing
opposing counsel an opportunity to cross-examine the witness.
Critics argue that testing testimony through cross-examination is not
as "important" when the witnesses have not been prepared and put
forth by one party - as in the civil law. Although forceful information
testing is not perceived as "important" in civil law jurisdictions, the
truthfulness and reliability of the information is still paramount. This
procedural nuance - the shared nature of witnesses - makes little
practical difference with regard to the inherent credibility of the
testimony and the need to test an information source. Damaging
evidence is damaging evidence, no matter who elicits it. As such, the
149. William T. Pizzi & Luca Marafioti, The New Italian Code of Criminal
Procedure: The Difficulties of Building an Adversarial Trial System on a Civil Law
Foundation, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 7 (1992).
150. Damarska, supra note 148, at 844-47.
151. Id at 845.
152. Id at 844.
153. Id. at 846.
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commonality of witnesses is unlikely to constitute a significant factor
enabling abrogation of the right in civil law jurisdictions, but not in
the United States. First, witnesses are common to both parties - they
are called by one party to the action, and would not likely have been
called if the witness did not advance the party position. And, as an
analogous point, civil law litigants have as much desire to ensure the
credibility of the witness, whether or not called by the judge, himself
or herself, or the opposing party as any common law litigant. Second,
a witness' credibility is often not at all related to the interest advanced
by a party in a criminal action, if any witness' interest is advanced at
all. As would be expected, common law parties call witnesses who
advance their proposition, but usually not because a witness wants to
be the witness for one party and not the other. Many witnesses
become unavailable because they do not want to cooperate with
attorneys.
Furthermore, just as in civil law jurisdictions, both parties in
common law jurisdictions have the right to call witnesses, including
the defendant's right to take the stand in his own defense. Both civil
law and common law testimony and evidence are elicited to describe
an event and to find the truth. The fact that an individual is not
available for cross-examination does not preclude a litigant from
critiquing the credibility of the testimony, or eliciting contradictory
evidence through alternative sources. The ability to "contradict"
testimony is a sufficient procedural safeguard in common law systems
as long as offered "at some time in the course of proceedings.'
54
Although testing a party witness is arguably important, cross-
examination is not the only way. In common law jurisdictions, the
defense actually has more control over what evidence is before a
judge because the defense controls the investigation and the party
position.
Common law systems are often better equipped to allow litigants
to challenge the credibility of testimony despite abrogation of the
right to confrontation. First, civil law parties do not speak with a
witness before testifying. While this might mitigate tampering or
coaching, this also inherently means that opposing counsel cannot
prepare or anticipate how to rebut testimony - either through asking
contradictory questions or by introducing contradictory evidence.
Testimony that appears credible while in court may not in fact be
154. Damarska, supra note 148, at 846.
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credible. Without the opportunity to call witnesses before trial,
counsel lack any opportunity to search for alternative sources or find
holes in information provided. Second, common law prosecutors are
required to discover all evidence that may be used against a
defendant. Civil law attorneys, on the other hand, do not have similar
discovery obligations. Discovery is almost unknown in civil law
countries."' Third, contested evidence is never put in front of the
arbiter of fact until vetted for admissibility and prejudicial value by a
neutral magistrate. This is not true in civil law systems where the
judge reviews all the evidence, and then renders a decision. Fifth,
evidence elicited by counsel in civil law countries necessarily becomes
part of the Court's dossier. The information may be damaging to the
party who requested it - so the practice may discourage attorneys
from requesting material at all.
With regard to the second difference, there appears a more
general cultural presumption that judges are more capable of
appropriately weighing evidence than the general lay person.
Therefore, critics are not concerned judges will misuse admitted
evidence - whereas lay jurors may be so inclined. Critics use this
argument to insist that admissibility must be more carefully
monitored and systematic in systems where lay jurors, and not judges,
are the ultimate arbiters of fact. As such, the mechanical procedural
rule of confrontation is most necessary in the common law, and
therefore has not developed with the same rigor in the civil law. This
proposition is wildly in conflict with the United States notion that a
trial by jury is a constitutional right, namely because a jury is a
preferred arbiter of fact.
In sum, the differences between the civil law and common law
systems do not justify divergent development of the right to
confrontation. Because of the common origin, purpose, and function
of the right in common law, hybrid, and civil law jurisdictions, the
balancing mechanisms are useful tools to evaluate an appropriate
balance of competing rights involved in the criminal justice system,
regardless of origin.
155. RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW 426 (5th ed. 1998).
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VII. The Scope of the Right to confrontation Throughout
U.S. Jurisprudence
The United States is out of synch with much of the world in
interpreting the significant principles underlying the right of the
confrontation. Moreover, the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Sixth Amendment in Crawford and Giles is inconsistent with the
spirit of the U.S. Constitution as well as the Court's own longstanding
interpretation of the Sixth Amendment. The right to confrontation is
just one right, in tandem with many other procedural guarantees, to
ensure the right to a fair trial. Face-to-face confrontation was
preferable but, prior to Crawford, the court embraced the notion that
"competing interests... may warrant dispensing with confrontation
at trial." These competing interests are manifest in the creation,
evolution, and acknowledgment of "deeply rooted" hearsay
exceptions that absolved an additional constitutional inquiry
throughout the history of the Sixth Amendment - indeed, until
Crawford156
The constitutional text does not define the scope of the
Confrontation Clause.15' The amendment was "only briefly discussed
prior to adoption."'58 The Supreme Court did not interpret the
Confrontation Clause until 1895 in Mattox v. United States. 59 The
Supreme Court's initial consideration of the Confrontation Clause in
Mattox tellingly created the first exception to the right to
confrontation - and established the reliability as the model for
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.' The Court held that the right
156. As even the concurring opinion in Crawfordpoints out, the historical analysis
of the majority is questionable. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69 (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring). Neither early history nor recent legal developments required or urged
adoption of the acceptance of the confrontation clause as a categorical an absolute
rule of exclusion of evidence from trial. Although the opinion was technically a
concurring opinion, in substance the decision largely dissents from Scalia's
arguments. Id. at 69-76.
157. Id at 42 ("The Constitution's text does not alone resolve this case.").
158. See Chase, supra note 55, at 1004, citingTHE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE
DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES AND ORIGINS 415-44 (Neil Cogan ed., 1997).
159. 156 U.S. 237 (1895). It is important to note that the United States Supreme
Court did discuss the Sixth Amendment in an earlier case entitled Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), which held that the Constitutional Immunity of the
Sixth Amendment did not apply to defendants who had procured a witness' absence
- the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to the Sixth Amendment.
160. The Court considered whether or not testimony of a decedent could be
admitted in a second trial against the accused. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 240-44. The
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to confrontation "must occasionally give way to considerations of
public policies and the necessities of the case" however "beneficent"
and "valuable to the accused.'' 1.. The law, "in its wisdom, declares
that the rights of the public shall not be wholly scarified in order than
an incidental benefit may be preserved to the accused.', 6 2 "For time
immemorial" certain hearsay exceptions have been "treated as
competent testimony" and "no one would have the hardihood to this
day to question their admissibility."' 63  These firmly rooted
164
exceptions must be admitted as an exception to "general rules"
regarding the Confrontation Clause in light of the "necessities of the
case," and as the only assurance to "prevent a manifest failure of
justice.' 65 In other words, Mattox clearly held that exceptions to the
Confrontation Clause are necessary where they ensure justice and
reliable prosecution. There was no mention of a separate right to
confront witnesses as a categorical, procedural rule. To the contrary,
if statements are made "under circumstances which give [a
declarant's] statements the same weight as if made under oath, there
is equal if not greater reason for admitting testimony."1 66
Consistently, post Mattox, but prior to Crawford, Supreme Court
jurisprudence communicated that the "principal aim" of the
Confrontation Clause was to ensure the reliability of evidence offered
against the accused. 67 In Ohio v. Roberts,16 decided just 25 years
prior to Crawford, the Court again endorsed that reliable hearsay
statements rendered cross-examination unnecessary.69  Hearsay
testimony was recorded by the court reporter in a first trial. Id. at 240. In holding
that the Confrontation Clause "must... give way," the Court concluded that a
defendant should not "go scot free simply because death has closed the mouth of that
witness." Id. at 243. This would be carrying his constitutional protection "to an
unwarrantable extent." Id.
161. Id. at 243 (emphasis added).
162. Id
163. Id.
164. This term "firmly rooted" would actually arise as a result of later Supreme
Court jurisprudence considering the Confrontation Clause. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
165. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 244.
166. Id. at 244 (emphasis added).
167. W. Jeremey Counseller & Shannon Rickett, The Confrontation Clause After
Crawford v. Washington; Smaller Mouth, Bigger Teeth, 57 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 2
(Winter, 2005).
168. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
169. Id. (Hearsay is admissible if it falls within a "firmly rooted hearsay exception"
or demonstrates a "particularized guarantee of trustworthiness"); Counseller &
Rickett, supra note 50, at 2.
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evidence was admissible if it fell within a "firmly rooted" hearsay
exception or conveyed some particularized "indicial of reliability."'70
Reliable hearsay, under the Roberts framework, comports with the
substance of the constitutional protection provided by the Sixth
Amendment. 7'
Crawford departs from the reliability model outlined in Roberts
and reads new guarantees into the Confrontation Clause as
historically defined. Now, "where testimonial statements are at issue,
the only indicium [sic] of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional
demands is... confrontation.' 7' As such, the Supreme Court made a
"fundamental shift" in 2003 and "abandoned" its view of the
Confrontation Clause as an evidentiary rule designed to ensure the
reliability of evidence and replaced it with a procedural rule that
grants a per se right to cross-examination. 73  In other words,
Crawford creates a new procedural right in that it guarantees a
defendant the right to test evidence in a specific way - by way of
cross-examination - regardless of the objective reliability of the
evidence. 74 Although the Crawfordcourt itself declared that primacy
of the clause is to find the truth, today the right to a fair trial requires
the right to cross-examine witnesses. In so doing, Crawfordoverruled
over two hundred years of reliability-based interpretation of the
Confrontation Clause.
Giles v. California is the Supreme Court's most recent decision in
the Confrontation Clause context. Although Giles did not address
the reliability versus procedural approaches to the Confrontation
Clause, Giles did significantly limit one of the two last-standing
exceptions to the right to confrontation: the forfeiture by wrongdoing
doctrine. 75 The doctrine was interpreted by the California Supreme
Court as generally disabling a defendant from invoking his right to
confront witnesses if he caused them to be unavailable to testify at
170. Roberts, 488 U.S. at 66.
171. See Counseller & Rickett, supra note 50, at 11 ("Unquestionably, the Roberts
analysis was designed to ensure the reliability of evidence offered against the
accused.").
172. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68-69.
173. Id. at 62 ("Dispensing with confrontation because testimony is obviously
reliable is akin to dispensing with a jury trial because the defendant is obviously
guilty.").
174. Id.
175. The last remaining "absolute" exception to the Confrontation Clause are
dying declarations.
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trial, regardless of the defendant's specific intent to silence the
witness at trial. The California court interpreted the forfeiture by
wrongdoing doctrine broadly, citing to Reynolds v. United States, 98
U.S. 145, 158 (1878), stating that in the alternative, a defendant would
receive a windfall for having committed murder as opposed to
another non-fatal crime.176 The Supreme Court reversed, and held
that a court would have to prove that the defendant silenced the
witness specifically to prevent damaging testimony at trial in order to
admit the testimony. In so doing, the right to confrontation became
even more inflexible. Although this development is tangential to the
purpose and interpretation of the Confrontation Clause, at least
insofar as the rule is interpreted in relation to the reliability or
procedural model of confrontation, this limitation read in tandem
with the new Crawford procedural rule strengthens a defendant's
position in the criminal justice equilibrium. Although somewhat
beyond the scope of the article, it is important to note that the trend
in the Supreme Court is moving confrontation away from reliability
towards procedure, and from flexibility to categorical inflexibility.
Both of these departures are related, and result in similar
consequences from the perspective of non-defense oriented interests
in the criminal justice system.
In sum, prior to Crawford, hearsay provisions constituted the
outer boundaries of the Confrontation Clause. Cross-examination
and hearsay together were a means to an end: The procedures and
related rules worked in conjunction with one another to protect the
same value - that the truth be presented at trial. Hearsay rules were
equally important to the right to confrontation in that they were, in
and of themselves, procedural safeguards. The Confrontation Clause
was an evidentiary rule to guarantee the reliability of evidence.
Where the evidence was deemed "sufficiently reliable," the right to
confrontation gave way. Both confrontation and hearsay law were
important to ensure a defendant's right to a fair trial, but also
accommodate other competing rights within the criminal justice
system, and ensure that justice results from criminal adjudication.
The right to confrontation today is not a "guarantor of reliability" but
a right to cross-examine - a categorical and mechanical procedural
rule. 77
176. People v. Giles, 19 Cal.Rptr. 3d 843, 848 (2004), superseded by Giles, 128
S.Ct. 2678 (2008).
177. Today, the confrontation clause has been interpreted as granting a defendant
2009]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
As early as the enlightened Mattox Court, the Supreme Court
foreshadowed that reading additional "new guaranties" under the
Confrontation Clause at a future date would disrupt the criminal
justice system.'78 The court warned forthcoming Sixth Amendment
interpreters from carrying the constitutional provision "further than is
necessary" as well as "further than the safety of the public will
warrant., 179  Crawford and Giles did not heed the Mattox warning,
and have disrupted the criminal justice equilibrium. The Supreme
Court has diverged from our own historical jurisprudence, not just
that of the international community.
VIII. A Case Study of the Aftermath of Crawford Sexual
Violence
We must review new developments in the right to confrontation
because the ramifications are significant - the new procedural rule
announced in Crawford has come at a cost to victim's and society's
stake in the criminal justice system. Most troublesome, the right to
confrontation has actually hit hardest the most vulnerable
prosecutions within the domestic criminal justice system, namely
sexual offenses including domestic violence. These crimes are unique
with regard to the trauma experienced by the victims, the lack of
corroborating evidence, and the heavy reliance on witness
testimony." °  Society suffers a large social cost when we cannot
prosecute crimes. This cost furthermore functions to the benefit of a
defendant who does not necessarily require this new procedural right
to guarantee a right to a fair trial.
Sexual violence cases reveal "core conflicts in the space where
the following five general rights: (1) the defendant has a right to be present at his
trial; (2) the defendant can require witnesses to testify in the defendant's presence;
(3) the defendant has the right to cross-examine witnesses against him; (4) the
defendant has a right to have excluded use of hearsay against him [within certain
parameters]; and (5) the right to have excluded confessions by another individual to
incriminate another. See Chase, supra note 55, at1005.
178. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243.
179. Id.
180. International Criminal Courts such as the ICC, ICTY, ICTR and other
tribunals developed to address war crimes do not handle prosecutions of domestic
violence. Therefore, in order to properly draw a comparison between rules of
evidence, this note will focus on prosecution involving crimes of sexual assault. Many
of the rules of evidence in sexual assault prosecutions would apply to domestic
violence prosecutions for the same reasons they arise during the prosecution of
sexual assault.
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evidence, law, and ethics intersect.' 8 ' This note draws attention to
the unique challenges associated with sexual assault prosecutions
because they are the most affected prosecutions within the United
States in the aftermath of Crawford. As just one example, a survey of
64 district attorney's offices in the United States indicated that 76
percent of offices were more likely to dismiss domestic violence cases
post Crawford'2 For instance, in 2005 in Dallas County, Texas,
judges dismissed "up to a dozen" domestic violence cases per day for
problems related to Crawford.3
Beyond the lack of political will, sexually violent crimes are
uniquely (and historically have been) among the most difficult crimes
to investigate and prosecute.184 Gathering evidence is uniquely
complex because sexual violence victims are "overwhelmingly
reluctant" to talk about their experiences.15  Witnesses may be so
traumatized by having to confront an attacker that a witness is often
unable to testify meaningfully, or at all.'86 Sexual assault victims
maintain emotional and psychological effects not present in other
types of crime. 17  Cross-examination of any victim is grueling, but
there is something especially degrading about the cross-examination
of a rape victim.'" She is made to relive a traumatic moment in her
life and discuss sexual matters in open court.
8 9
This phenomenon is exacerbated by the fact that victims of
sexual violence have historically been treated with suspicion.
181. Aviva Orenstein, Symposium, Ethics and Evidence v. The Use of Prejudicial
Evidence, Special Issues Raised by Rape Trial, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1585
(December 2007). For the purposes of this note, although potentially flawed for
oversimplification, I will refer to "sexual violence" as inclusive of the crimes of
domestic violence, which often involves some component of sexual assault, rape, and
sexual assault. The reasons, at least from an evidentiary perspective, that these
crimes can be grouped together is because they all often involve uncooperative
witnesses, usually female, and a lack of corroborating evidence because of how they
are perpetrated. See generally, e.g., Percival, infra note 184; Marsil, infra note 186.
182. Lininger, supra note 11.
183. Id.
184. Jeanine Percival, The Price of Silence: The Prosecution of Domestic Violence
Cases in Light of Crawford v Washington, 79 So. CAL. L. REV. 213, 235 (2005).
185. Lakatos, supra note 30, at 919.
186. See generally Dorothy Marsil, et al., Child Witness Policy: Law Interfacing
with Social Science, 65 Law. & Contemp. Probs. 209 (Winter, 2002).
187. Polorak, supra note 29, at 700.
188. Orenstein, supra note 181, at 1603.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1587.
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Procedural abuses occur in any number of instances, but nowhere do
such abuses generate "moral outcry" and "particular indignation" to
the level of sexual violence cases."' There is no reason to fear higher
incidence of false reports in the sexual violence context - studies
show that to the contrary, rape specifically is "widely
underreported."'2 False reports of rape are no more common than
false reports of other crimes; they are negligible.93 Rape attrition in
cases is "shockingly high," and very few rapists are ever convicted of
the crime."9 These misogynistic assumptions about the veracity of
women's accusations are wholly unfounded in reality. Furthermore,
there is typically a dearth of corroborating evidence: 95 these crimes
occur in private, with limited witnesses, if any, and unless reported
immediately, lack forensic evidence.
For these reasons, sexual assault prosecution is unique because it
is heavily reliant on victimless prosecution. In other words, society
has demonstrated an interest in prosecuting the crime despite
uncooperative or unavailable victims.'9 Hearsay has often been the
191. Id at 1588.
192. Orenstein, supra note 181, at 1591 n. 28, citingThe Center of Disease Control
and Prevention; see also David P. Bryden & Sonja Lengnick, Rape in the Criminal
Justice System, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1194, 1195, 1220 (1997).
193. Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 192, at 1195, 1200, 1297-1298.
194. Id. at 1195.
195. While corroboration is not usually legally required to support a conviction,
juries are, understandably, reluctant to convict on the basis of single-witness
testimony. See id at 1382 (prosecutors are at a disadvantage in pure swearing
contests - although corroboration is not required, it is difficult to eliminate
reasonable doubt without corroboration). Because of the unique nature of rape,
many incidents are inherently unable to be corroborated. This is not necessarily
reflected in rapes that are prosecuted, because many of these evidentiary-weak cases
are filtered out at the various stages of the criminal justice process. Id.
196. Deborah Tuerkheiemer, Exigency, 49 ARIz L. REV. 801, 833 (Winter, 2007).
Victimless prosecution is the term used to describe prosecutions that proceed without
the testimony of the victim. Various competing reasons are given, but usually the
prosecution proceeds without the victim for three primary reasons: (1) the victim will
not cooperate; (2) the prosecution fears for the victims safety; or (3) the prosecution
seeks to avoid re-victimizing the victim. These concerns are uniquely prevalent in the
context of sexual assault, rape, and domestic violence. Victimless prosecutions rely
heavily on hearsay statements made by a victim to 911 operators, investigators, police
officers, doctors and other medical personnel, and social workers. For a brief
discussion of victimless prosecution in the context of domestic violence prosecutions,
see Andrew King Reis, Crawford v. Washington: The End of Victimless Prosecution,
28 SEATrLE U. L. REV. 301, 301 (2004-2005); see also Liniger, supra note 11, at 752
(80% of domestic violence victims refuse to assist in prosecution of domestic
violence) citing People v. Brown, 94 P. 3d 574, 576 (2004).
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"linchpin" of prosecutions in these cases. 197 Crawford has had an
enormous impact on the domestic prosecution of sexual violence.'
98
The Court's confrontation jurisprudence "is.. .in tension with
empirical realities" of victimless prosecution, and witness-reliant
prosecution in general."9 The problem of sexual violence (including
domestic violence) exposes "more deeply embedded normative
failings" but failings nonetheless "unconfined to the cases that most
starkly illuminate them."2"
The dramatic impact of Crawfordon sexual violence prosecution
is just one example of the impact Crawfordhas had within the United
States. On an international scale, sexual violence is widely and
commonly considered as a crime that, by its nature, is particularly
affected by the right to confrontation. The problems prosecutors face
in foreign and international jurisdictions have addressed sexual
violence in particular, and have created many inroads into victim-
based bulwarks to the right to confrontation in this context.
Therefore, this area is uniquely suited for comparative analysis.
However, the sexual violence exemplar is not intended to propose
that evidence codes should yield or relax exclusively in the sexual
violence context, at least insofar as the right to confrontation is
concerned. The right to confrontation, for example, makes no
197. Lininger, supra note 11, at 771.
198. Within "days - even hours - of the Crawford decision, prosecutors were
losing hundreds of domestic violence cases that would have presented little difficulty
in the past. Id. at 749. See also, e.g., Reis, supra note 197, at 302 (with Crawford, the
Supreme Court has placed the future of victimless prosecution "in doubt."); see also
Melissa Moody, A Blow to Domestic Violence Victims: Applying the Testimonial
test in Crawford, 11 WM & MARY WOMEN & L. 387, 388 (2005) (the Court's
academically appealing interpretation of the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation
has significantly eroded offender accountability in domestic violence prosecutions);
Gary Bishop, Testimonial Statements, Excited Utterances and the Confrontation
Clause: Formulating a Precise Rule after Crawford and Davis, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
559, 605 (2006) (Crawford poses new challenges [in the are of domestic violence]
because the prosecution of such cases "relies heavily" in hearsay statements made to
the police, law enforcement officers, and 911 operators.). Much of the Crawford
critique has arisen in relation to domestic violence. It is important to note here,
though, that the primary reason that domestic violence is hard to prosecute is
because women do not report the crime, or later recant or refuse to press charges.
Rape and sexual assault is similarly "under-prosecuted" because victims do not
cooperate, for the same reasons. See Bryden, supra note 192, at 1377. It logically
follows that the problems with prosecuting incidents of domestic violence are
necessarily present in prosecutions of rape and sexual assault.
199. Teurkheimer, supra note 196, at 835.
200. Id. at 835.
2009]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
exception for a declarant who is made unavailable at trial by a
criminal defendant's wrongdoing unless the declarant was silenced
specifically in anticipation of trial.20' In other words, a defendant can
exclude statements made by a declarant-victim he killed as part of his
underlying criminal charge, but not statements made by a declarant
whom he bribed not to testify against him. Although other scenarios
are beyond the scope of the article, the recent ruling in Giles v.
California illuminates how the strict procedural interpretation of the
right has impacted the ability to vindicate even the most egregious
criminal victimizations in the name of a right to a fair trial.2 2
Although the Crawford Court vehemently rejected the balancing
tests utilized in Crawfords predecessor, Ohio v. Roberts, the Court
nonetheless has endorsed discretionary balancing tests under other
evidentiary provisions, such as Federal Rule of Evidence section 403.
While the Court regularly endorses sensitivity for excluding evidence,
trial courts could alternatively benefit from a similar test allowing for
admission of inadmissible evidence when the needs of justice require,
even when the right to confrontation is implicated. Ohio, but not
Crawford, allowed for this nuanced inquiry. Facts-and-circumstances
analyses are not uncommon in relation to admitting and excluding
evidence at trial.
201. Giles, 128 S.Ct. 2678.
202. The Giles plurality defined the scope of the forfeiture by wrongdoing
exception to the Confrontation Clause, which remains one of only two exceptions to
the confrontation clause. The United States Supreme Court reversed the California
Supreme Court opinion that held that the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to the
Confrontation Clause should allow admission of statements made by any declarant
made unavailable at trial, whether for the specific purpose of witness tampering or as
a result of the wrongdoing underlying the criminal charge, such as murder. The
United States Supreme Court held that Crawford precluded such a finding and held
that the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to the Confrontation Clause only applies
if the defendant made a witness unavailable for the explicit purpose of preventing the
testimony at trial. Although this might sometimes be the case in murder, where the
crime underlying the criminal charge as the very charge that made the victim
unavailable, the prosecution would have to show that the defendant had an intent to
silence the victim in anticipation of trial, not simply silence the victim through
murder. The plurality vehemently dismissed looking to policy or reliability of
evidence as a reason to abrogate the Confrontation right. The other exception to the
confrontation clause is a dying declaration. See generally Giles, 128 S.Ct. 2678.
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Right to a Fair Trial
IX. Crawford Should Be Overruled
The reason to review the new developments in the right to
confrontation is significant - this new substantive right has come at a
cost because it has encroached on victims' rights and society's stake in
the criminal justice system. Most troublesome, the right to
confrontation has hit hardest the most vulnerable prosecutions within
the domestic criminal justice system, namely sexual offenses,
including domestic violence. These crimes are unique with regard to
the trauma experienced by the victims, the lack of corroborating
evidence, and the heavy reliance on witness testimony.
The International Criminal Court ("ICC"), the ICTY and the
ICTR have taken an "important step" in recognizing and in
establishing victims' rights.0 3 The ICC specifically makes clear on
many occasions that the Court must balance its two important
objectives of protection of witnesses and fair trial for the accused.2"
Notably, the Tribunal rules restrict cross-examination to preserve a
central purpose of the criminal justice system: fact finding and
establishing the truth.0 5
The right to confrontation is useful for truth finding, but it is the
Court's objective duty to find the optimal procedure to bring out the
truth.2" The right of cross-examination is certainly not the best way
to secure objectively reliable evidence. While generally useful, the
fundamental purpose behind the right to confrontation is not a
categorical procedural right.
Crawford is "too rigid."2" It has and will continue to create
undesirable side effects "with regard to both truth finding and witness
protection. ' '108  These negative side effects easily outweigh the
benefits. Truth finding must be optimized within the criminal justice
system, because the defendant's rights are not the only rights that
must be considered within the criminal justice process. Crawford has
a unique impact in the context of sexual and domestic violence;
nowhere is it more problematic and likely to result in failed
203. Garkawe, supra note 14, at 345.
204. Id. at 354.
205. See Lakatos, supra note 30, at 933-934.
206. See, e.g., Walther, supra note 2, at 473; see also Lininger, supra note 11, at
749-50.
207. Walther, supra note 2, at 471.
208. Id.
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prosecutions."' Therefore, the Crawford decision affects some of the
most vulnerable victims in the criminal justice process. Any
procedural rule that is likely to result in failed prosecutions threatens
the balance of competing interests within the criminal justice system
and offends the rule of law.
Given the universality of the right to confrontation, foreign and
international jurisdictions provide interesting comparative sources for
finding that confrontation is presumed to ensure reliability and a fair
trial. Overall, "the search for custom or general principal reveals that
[cross-examination] is an important procedural safeguard" of the
right to a fair trial.21° As the foreign and international jurisdictions
highlighted demonstrate, there are other procedural safeguards that
do not restrict the ability to find the truth, and vindicate and
prosecute crimes in the way that the Crawfordright to confrontation
does. The right to confrontation, universally, is not an absolute right
that every witness must be heard and cross-examined. t
Although one may hesitate to accept an international perspective
on the right to confrontation, one does not need to accept an
international interpretation to find that Crawford was wrongly
decided. Our own historical jurisprudence employs the reliability
model of confrontation.
209. See, e.g., Lininger, supra note 11, at 750.
210. Lakatos, supra note 30, at 932.
211. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Judging Dujail: The First Trial Before the
Iraqi High Tribunal, Vol. 18, No. 9, at 14 (2006), citing Kostowski v. The
Netherlands, (1990) 12 EUR. CT. H. R. 434.
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